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Abstract
In contrast with previous studies, we postulate that there is no ex-ante
commitment over the type of contract (i.e., price or quantity) which a ﬁrm
oﬀers consumers. In the context of a unionized symmetric duopoly we
instead argue that the mode of competition which in equilibrium emerges
is the one that entails the most beneﬁcial outcome for both the ﬁrm and
its labour union, in each ﬁrm/union pair, given the choice of the rival
pair. Our ﬁndings suggest that monopoly unions with risk-averse/neutral
members may eﬀectively act as commitment devices driving ﬁrms to the
symmetric Cournot mode of competition.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D43; J51; L13
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The cornerstones of modern oligopoly theory are the models of Cournot-Nash,
where rival ﬁrms independently adjust their quantities, and Bertrand- Nash,
where the rival ﬁrms’ strategic variables are their prices. However, and though
these alternative hypotheses deliver highly signiﬁcant implications to the the-
ory and practice of industrial economics (see, among else, Okuguchi, 1987; Qiu,
1997; Amir and Jin, 2001), a full understanding of what induces the mode of
competition is still to come. In their seminal paper Singh and Vives (1984) ex-
plored this question in the context of a symmetric industry where ﬁrms, facing
exogenous marginal costs in the upstream input market, compete in a down-
stream market with diﬀerentiated goods. Each ﬁrm is assumed to make two
types of binding contracts with consumers: the price contract and the quantity
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1contract. That is, if a ﬁrm chooses the price contract it is committed to supply
the amount the consumers demand at a predetermined price, independently of
the action of the competitor. Similarly, if a ﬁrm chooses the quantity contract,
it is committed to supply a predetermined quantity, at the market bearing price.
In a two-stage game, where ﬁrms simultaneously choose the type of contract to
oﬀer consumers, ﬁrst, and subsequently compete contingent on the chosen types
of contracts, the dominant strategy for each ﬁrm is found to be the quantity
(price) contract, if goods are substitutes (complements). This work has inspired
a number of variant studies on the determinants of the diﬀerent types of imper-
fect competition (see e.g. Cheng, 1985 ; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986 ; Dastidar,
1997). However, in all those contributions the reason why ﬁrms can credibly
commit to a particular mode of competition is not explicitly unravelled.1
More recently, Correa-López and Naylor (2004) extend the analysis of Singh
and Vives, by postulating that the input price which each downstream ﬁrm
faces is the outcome of a ﬁrst stage-bargain with its upstream input supplier
(labour union), rather than being exogenously determined. Given the wages, in
the second stage either both ﬁrms adjust their quantities, or both ﬁrms adjust
their prices. The main ﬁnding is that, if unions are relatively powerful in the
wage bargain and attach high relative importance to wages in their objective
functions, equilibrium proﬁts under the Bertrand regime may exceed those under
the Cournot regime, in the case of imperfect substitutes. Yet, in line with the
reviewed literature, in this study it is also assumed that when ﬁrm/union pairs
independently bargain over the wage the (ad-hoc) type of contract which ﬁrms
will symmetrically oﬀer consumers, in the continuation of the game, is credible.
In this paper we refrain from these rather strong assumptions. Our postulate
is that there is no ex-ante commitment over the type of contract which each ﬁrm
will oﬀer consumers, and that each can independently shift from the quantity
(price) mode, to the price (quantity) mode, unless a commitment device exists
which in equilibrium deters the ﬁrm to do so. In the context of a two-tier diﬀer-
entiated duopoly, where ﬁrms produce substitute goods and the upstream input
(labour) market comprises of two ﬁrm-speciﬁc unions, we argue that the mode
of competition which eﬀectively emerges is the one that entails the most beneﬁ-
cial outcome for both the ﬁrm and the union in each ﬁrm/union pair, given the
choice of the rival pair. This argument reﬂects the idea that deviating from price
(quantity) towards quantity (price) requires an implicit agreement between both
parties involved in each pair, since a wage-veto on the part of the union is suﬃ-
cient for the price (quantity) to be sustained as the ﬁrm’s mode of competition in
the equilibrium. Interestingly, our ﬁndings suggest that the quantity (Cournot)
mode of competition is always sustained by both ﬁrms in equilibrium, so long
as unions possess all the power over the wage bargain (monopoly unions), and
the average union member is risk averse/neutral. Hence, under rather standard
assumptions in the trade unions literature (see e.g., Booth, 1995) we argue that
the existence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc unions can be a decisive factor driving ﬁrms to a
1In a diﬀerent context, Lambertini (1997) investigates cartel stability in a repeated duopoly
game where ﬁrms choose non-cooperatively the strategic variable to collude on and ﬁnds that
they prefer price-setting collusion.
2high-proﬁt mode of competition.
2 The model
The structure of our envisaged industrial sector is similar to that of Singh and
Vives (1984) and Correa-López and Naylor (2004), thus making our results
strictly comparable to those studies. We consider an industry that consists of
two ﬁrms, and each ﬁrm produces a brand i =1 ,2 of a good qi,r e q u i r i n go n l y
labour input, with constant returns to scale. Hence, the production function of
ﬁrm i is qi = Li, i =1 ,2,w h e r eLi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc labour input, whilst the
(inverse) demand function for brand i is given by:
Pi = a − qi − γqj,i , j =1 ,2,i6= j (1)
where, a>0 and γ ∈ (0,1) is a measure of substitutability among brands; if
γ → 0 brands are regarded as (almost) unrelated, whereas γ → 1 corresponds
to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
The labour market is unionized. Workers are assumed to be organized into
two separate, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, unions and union membership is ﬁxed. Each union
is of the utilitarian type, i.e., the union’s objective is to maximize the sum of
individual workers’ utilities:
Ui(wi,L i)=( wi)ϕLi (2)
Where, wi is the wage rate of ﬁrm i and ϕ ∈ (0,1] denotes the representa-
tive union member’s risk aversion, as measured by the elasticity of substitution
between wages and employment. We further consider that each union possesses
all the power to set its ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rate. In our context this means that,
in any ﬁrm-union negotiation, the union proposes the ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rate,
whilst the ﬁrm proposes the mode of competition, with employment decisions
being left to the ﬁrms’ discretion.2
The timing of our postulated game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, each
union proposes a wage rate to its own ﬁr mw h i c hi sc o n t i n g e n tu p o nt h eﬁrm’s
proposal regarding its mode of competition (price or quantity) to be materialized
in the second stage. So long as the parties agree on a particular wage/mode
of competition scheme, the game proceeds to the second stage.3 In the second
2Although in real life the wage rate and (possibly) the employment level is determined
via ﬁrm-union negotiations, it is a regular assumption in the union-oligopoly literature that
the union has all the power in wage negotiations, while the ﬁrm has all the power to set the
employment level (see Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004 and the references therein).
3Agreement means that a proposed wage/mode of competition scheme is sustained because,
neither the union, nor the ﬁrm, ﬁnd a deviation from it on their best interest. If they do,
a unanimous consent is as well needed for a new scheme to be sustained. Yet, if no such
consent can be found, and since the union possesses all the power to set the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
wage, the chosen mode of competition inevitably is that which is consistent with the union’s
most preferred one, with the union vetoing any alternative proposal. Eﬀectively, this is done
as the union sticks to a wage proposal which is contingent upon its most preferred mode of
competition.
3stage, given the mode of competition to which each ﬁrm has thus been credibly
committed, and the wages which have been consistently set, ﬁrms compete in
the product market by independently adjusting, either their own price, or their
own quantity.4
3 Equilibrium mode of competition
Solving by backwards induction, we investigate the conditions under which
quantity or price emerges as the chosen mode of competition, for either ﬁrm,
in the Nash equilibrium. That is, we propose a candidate conﬁguration in the
modes of the competition (one for each ﬁrm) at the second stage, and subse-
quently check whether or not it survives all possible deviations,a tt h eﬁrst stage.
If yes, the candidate conﬁguration proposed is the sub-game perfect equilibrium
one.
3.1 Symmetric Cournot competition
We begin by proposing as a candidate conﬁguration the one where both ﬁrm/union
pairs agree over the quantity as the ﬁrm’s mode of competition. In this case
the ﬁrm/union pair i may deviate by instead agreeing ﬁrm i to set its price as
its mode of competition, given that the j ﬁrm’s mode is its own quantity. Our
ﬁndings are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The symmetric Cournot mode of competition is always an equi-
librium mode of competition. The reason is that, for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1],
in each ﬁrm/union pair i, neither the ﬁrm nor its union have an incentive for
ﬁrm i to deviate from quantity setting to price setting.
Proof. See Appendix 1
3.2 Symmetric Bertrand competition
We next propose as a candidate conﬁguration the one where both ﬁrm/union
pairs agree over the price as the ﬁrm’s mode of competition. In this case the
ﬁrm/union pair i may deviate by instead agreeing ﬁrm i to set its quantity as
its mode of competition, given that the j ﬁrm’s mode is its price. Our ﬁndings
are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The symmetric Bertrand mode of competition is never an equi-
librium mode of competition. The reason is that, for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1],
in each ﬁrm/union pair i, both the ﬁrm and its union have an incentive for ﬁrm
i to deviate from price setting to quantity setting.
Proof. See Appendix 2
4The crucial, yet (due to the symmetric industry) reasonable assumption here is that the
ﬁrm’s and union’s agreement upon the mode of competition in each ﬁrm/union pair, is not
observable by the rival pair, before wage-setting is everywhere completed.
43.3 Asymmetric Cournot (Bertrand) — Bertrand (Cournot)
competition
Finally, we propose as a candidate conﬁguration the one where ﬁrm/union pair
i (j) agrees over the quantity (price) as the mode of competition of ﬁrm i (j),
given that the j (i) ﬁrm’s mode is its own price (quantity).5 In this case, of
course, there are two possible deviations: ﬁrm/union pair i may deviate by
instead agreeing ﬁrm i (j) to set its price (quantity) as its mode of competition,
given that the j (i) ﬁrm’s mode is its own price (quantity). Our ﬁndings are
summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The asymmetric Cournot (Bertrand) — Bertrand (Cournot) mode
of competition, is never an equilibrium mode of competition. The reason is that,
(a) In ﬁrm/union pair i, if ϕ =1and 0.99 >γ>0.90, ﬁrm i does have
an incentive to deviate from quantity setting to price setting. Yet, its union,
having the same incentive only if ϕ =1and γ>0.99,w i l le ﬀectively veto such
a deviation, by always proposing a wage rate contingent upon the ﬁrm’s quantity
as its mode of competition.
(b) In ﬁrm/union pair j, for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1],b o t ht h eﬁrm and
its union have a unanimous incentive for ﬁrm j to deviate from price setting to
quantity setting.
(c) If 1 >γ>0.99 and ϕ =1 , (a) and (b) imply that a unique stable
equilibrium in the asymmetric mode of competition can not be found.6
Proof. See Appendix 3
4C o n c l u s i o n s
Our main ﬁnding is that in unionized oligopolies, with decentralized bargaining,
monopoly unions with risk-averse/neutral members may eﬀectively act as com-
mitment devices driving ﬁrms to a high-proﬁt mode of competition in quantities.
In contrast to Correa-López and Naylor (2004), proposing that, if φ>1,t h e
ad-hoc Cournot-Bertrand proﬁtd i ﬀerential will take negative values, we pro-
pose that monopoly unions, always driven by the risk aversion of their average
member (e.g., φ ≤ 1), will always set wages suﬃciently high so that their ﬁrms
will not be marginalized in terms of output/employment.7 Hence, in line with
Singh and Vives (1984), we suggest that the union’s rents, along with the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt, will be maximised only when the ﬁrm may achieve suﬃcient mark-up to
pay back a high labour bill. Our argument is made more clear by recalling that,
only if φ =1and γ>0.99 (see e.g., Proposition 3 (a)), the union of ﬁrm i
5Of course, due to the symmetric industry structure, the reverse conﬁguration is as well
(implicitly) proposed as the candidate conﬁguration.
6Note that a unique stable equilibrium of this type may however exist in mixed strategies.
Yet, such a consideration is beyond the scope of our present analysis.
7Note that φ>1 eﬀectively implies that the average union’s member’s marginal utility of
income is increasing. It further entails that the union’s objective’s indiﬀerence curves may
be horizontal in the (w,L) space. This, in turn, implies that the “eﬃcient bargains” and the
“right-to-manage” hypotheses are empirically indistinguishable.
5will (also) have an incentive for ﬁrm i to deviate from quantity setting to price
setting, given that ﬁrm j also adjusts its price in the downstream market. The
reason is that, since products will in this case be almost perfect substitutes,
ﬁrms will be driven to set prices equal to marginal costs, under the emerging
Bertrand competition in homogenous products. Therefore, it is only when union
members place an equal weight to wage and employment (i.e., φ =1 )t h a tt h e
adverse eﬀect on union rents, brought about by the lower wage charged, can be
overcompensated by the ensuing higher output/employment.
Appendix
Candidate Equilibria
Symmetric Cournot competition: Given the wages, in the second stage,
ﬁrms simultaneously set quantities so as to maximize proﬁts
ΠC
i =( a − qi − γqj − wi)Li (A1)





(a − γqj − wi) (A2)
Solving the system of foc, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities
qC
i (wi,w j)=
a(γ − 2) + 2wi − γwj
γ2 − 4
(A3)








In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrm-level unions simultaneously set their
ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates, so as to maximize
UC
i (wi,w j)=
(wi)ϕ [a(γ − 2) + 2wi − γwj]
γ2 − 4
(A5)
The union i’s wage response function in wages under the assumption of a
non-cooperative Cournot—Nash equilibrium in the product market is given by
wC
i (wj)=
2aϕ − aγϕ + γϕwj
2(1+ϕ)
(A6)





ϕ(γ − 2) − 2
(A7)
Substituting wC
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4(1 + ϕ)+γ(2 − ϕγ)
(A11)
Symmetric Bertrand competition: Solving the system of inverse de-




a(1 − γ) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (A12)
Given the wages, in the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously set prices so as
to maximize proﬁts
ΠB
i =( pi − wi)
a(1 − γ) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (A13)
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− 2wi − γwj
γ2 − 4
(A15)
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(γ2 − 4)
2 (γ2 − 1)
#2
(A16)
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrm-level unions simultaneously set their
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γ4 − 5γ2 +4
(A17)
The union i’s wage response function in wages under the assumption of a
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(A19)
Substituting wB
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(A23)
Asymmetric quantity (price) - price (quantity) competition: As-
sume that ﬁrm 1 sets the quantity while ﬁrm 2 the price. In that case, ﬁrm 1

























a(1 − γ)+γp2 − w1
2(1− γ)
2 (A25)
Similary, ﬁrm 2 sets p2 to maximize its proﬁts p2q2,s u b j e c tt oq2 = a −
γq1 − p2,t a k i n gp1as given. Thus, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function is given by
Π
QP
2 =( p1 − w2)(a − γq1 − p2) (A26)
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In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrm-level unions simultaneously set their












































(1 + ϕ)(γ2 − 2)
(A35)
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2 into (A28), (A29), (1), (A30), (A31), (A32) and
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Suppose that ﬁrm/union pair j ≡ 2 sticks to the quantity, as the ﬁrm 2’s
mode of competition, while ﬁrm/union pair i ≡ 1 decides to deviate towards
setting the price. In this case, in the ﬁrst stage union 2 sets the wage wC
2 that
corresponds to the symmetric Cournot competition, while union 1 uses its wage
response function w
PQ









(1 + ϕ)(γ2 − 2)
where wC
1d <w C




1 (w1,w 2),w h e r e :w1 = wC
1d and w2 = wC














(γ − 2) − 2
¡
γ2 + γ − 2
¢¤
(1 + ϕ)[ϕ(γ − 2) − 2](4 − 3γ2)
where UC
1d <U C
1 , for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1], implying that the union 1
does not have an incentive for its ﬁrm to deviate towards setting its own price
as its mode of competition.




where: w1 = wC
1d and w2 = wC








(γ − 2) − 2
¡
γ2 + γ − 2
¢¤2
(1 + ϕ)
2 [ϕ(γ − 2) − 2]
2 (4 − 3γ2)2
It proves that ΠC
1d < ΠC
1 , for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1], implying that
neither ﬁrm 1 has an incentive to deviate from the symmetric Cournot mode of
competition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Suppose that ﬁrm/union pair j ≡ 2 sticks to the price as the ﬁrm 2’s mode
of competition, while ﬁrm/union pair i ≡ 1 decides to deviate towards setting
the quantity. In this case, in the ﬁrst stage union 2 sets the wage wB
2 that
corresponds to the symmetric Bertrand competition, while union 1 uses its wage
response function w
QP
















1 (w1,w 2),w h e r e :w1 = wB
1d and w2 = wB




















(γ − 2) − 2ϕ
¡
γ2 + γ − 2
¢¤
2ϕ (1 + ϕ)(3γ2 − 4)[ϕ(γ2 + γ − 2) + γ2 − 2]
where UB
1d >U B
1 , for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1], implying that the union 1
does have an incentive for its ﬁrm to deviate towards setting its own quantity
as its mode of competition.




where: w1 = wB
1d and w2 = wB








(γ − 2) − 2
¡
γ2 + γ − 2
¢¤2
(1 + ϕ)
2 [ϕ(γ − 2) − 2]
2 (4 − 3γ2)2
11It proves that ΠB
1d > ΠB
1 , for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1], implying that
also ﬁrm 1 has always an incentive to deviate from the symmetric Bertrand
competition, towards setting its own quantity as its mode of competition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Firm/union 1 deviate
Suppose, that ﬁrm/union pair 2 sticks to the price as the ﬁrm 2’s mode of
competition, while ﬁrm/union pair 1 decides to deviate towards setting the price
too. In this case, in the ﬁrst stage union 2 sets the wage w
QP
2 that corresponds
to the asymmetric equilibrium (Quantity - Price), while union 1 uses its wage
response function wB
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1 only if ϕ =1and γ>0.99. This implies that the union
1 has an incentive for its ﬁrm to deviate towards setting the price as its mode
of competition only if ϕ =1and γ>0.99.
On the other hand, if ﬁrm 1 deviates towards setting the price, its proﬁts
are given by Π
QP
1d = ΠB
1 (w1,w 2),w h e r e :w1 = w
QP
1d and w2 = w
QP

















1 only if ϕ =1and γ>0.90,i m p l y i n gt h a t ,g i v e nϕ =1
,t h eﬁrm 1 has an incentive to deviate from the asymmetric Cournot-Bertrand
competition towards setting the price for a lower (than its union) γ value.
Firm/union 2 deviate
Suppose, that ﬁrm/union pair 1 sticks to the quantity as the ﬁrm 1’s mode
of competition, while ﬁrm/union pair 2 decides to deviate towards setting the
quantity too.
12In this case, in the ﬁrst stage union 1 sets the wage w
QP
1 that corresponds
to the asymmetric equilibrium (Quantity - Price), while union 2 uses its wage
response function wC
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QP
1 and w2 = w
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2 , for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1], implying that union 2
h a sa l w a y sa ni n c e n t i v ef o ri t sﬁrm to deviate towards setting the quantity as
its mode of competition.




where: w1 = w
QP
1 and w2 = w
QP















(1 + ϕ)2 (γ − 2)
2 (γ +2 )






2 , for all γ ∈ (0,1) and ϕ ∈ (0,1],i m p l y i n gt h a tﬁrm 2
h a sa l w a y sa ni n c e n t i v ef o ri t sﬁrm to deviate towards setting the quantity as
its mode of competition.
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